INTRODUCTION
Companies in nearly every industry collect, store, and use personal information from consumers. Recently, company databases have become the target of increasingly sophisticated attacks aimed at stealing this information. Data breaches occur with such regularity that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has separated companies into two categories: "those that have been hacked, and
The district court ultimately found that the FTC made a plausible case for its authority, but based its holding on the weight of precedent surrounding the FTC's general use of the FTC Act in information security cases. 6 Thus, the FTC's reliance on the FTC Act is currently permitted, but could be challenged in the future.
LabMD's challenge of the FTC's authority was significant however, because there is no legislative or executive action on privacy, so the FTC's guidance, best practices, and enforcement set the de facto "privacy law." 7 As the FTC casts an increasingly wider net with or without congressional or executive action on data security, the future of the FTC Act's scope in this area is uncertain.
I. BACKGROUND
The FTC Act declares "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce" to be unlawful. 8 The FTC has used both the "deceptive" and "unfair" categories of the FTC Act in data security 1. Stacy Cowley, FBI Director: Cybercrime Will Eclipse Terrorism, CNNMONEY (Mar. 2, 2012, 7:55 AM) , http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/ index.htm. The Director went on to say " [e] ven that is merging into one category: those that have been hacked and will be again." Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. § § 41-58 (2006 , Supp. IV 2011 , & Supp. V 2012 ). 3. No. 1:12-cv-3005 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012 REV. 127, 145-49 (2008) ("The [FTC] has taken the lead in the United States in regulating privacy issues online.").
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) .
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cases. 9 These cases typically involve settlement discussions in which the company enters into a consent order with the FTC. 10 The consent orders are published for public comment, and, if acceptable, are approved by the FTC. 11 In the settlement, the FTC typically sets a privacy framework and retains the ability to review the company. For example, in a consent order with Google, Inc., 12 the FTC included the enactment of a comprehensive privacy program as a term in the settlement of the action. 13 The FTC went further in a consent order with Facebook, Inc. 14 when it required Facebook to follow the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Principles 15 in addition to enacting a privacy program.
16 These settlement and enforcement mechanisms can be controversial based on the FTC's broad exercise of power over information privacy and the relevant law.
A. Deception
The FTC Act lists deceptive practices that are unlawful.
17
The deception category is intended to combat statements and published policies breached or disregarded by the companies that published them.
18
The unauthorized collection of information, or collection that extends beyond limits set by a company's stated privacy policy, is fertile ground for enforcement actions under the deception category.
Establishing a violation of the FTC Act's prohibition of deceptive practices requires a showing of a material representation or practice that is "likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 9. Id. 10. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27, 2012) , available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookdo.pdf (describing a settlement with the FTC for privacy violations); Google, Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011) Additionally, the FTC Act imposes a heightened pleading requirement to prove a violation based on deceptive practices. 20 The FTC has a relatively easy argument when it can show that a company has made promises to consumers that it has not kept. For example, the FTC leveraged a section 5 complaint into a consent decree with Google. 21 There, the FTC charged that Google's roll-out of "Google Buzz"-a social-media feature of Google's e-mail service, Gmail-allowed consumers to choose whether they took part in Google Buzz. 22 However, many consumers' personal information was added to Google Buzz despite the fact that they had opted out of the service. 23 Thus, by collecting this information without the user's permission, Google faced FTC charges for deceptive practices.
24 By finding a violation of the FTC Act when companies fail to fulfill their promises to consumers, the FTC has successfully used the deception category of section 5 against some of the largest players in the world of consumer data collection. 25 
B. Unfairness
The unfairness category of section 5 provides a broad yet more diffuse source of authority for enforcing information privacy. Under the unfairness category, the company practice must injure consumers and violate established public policy. 26 Recognizing that it would be impossible to create an exhaustive list of unfair trade practices,
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Congress left the FTC responsible for identifying such practices.
27
The 1980 Unfairness Statement guides the analysis of whether the Commission properly applied the unfairness doctrine in a particular situation. In 1994, the FTC codified the Unfairness Statement in a revision to section 5(n), which now states that:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.
28
The FTC has since used the unfairness category as a basis for complaints against companies that have inadequate data security. For example, in a complaint against BJ's Wholesale Club, the FTC alleged that BJ's lack of security allowed for thousands of consumers' credit and debit card information to be taken. 29 Similarly, the FTC filed a complaint against Designer Shoe Warehouse (DSW), alleging improper information practices.
30
DSW collected consumer credit card information-including names, card numbers, and expiration dates. 31 The company then stored the information unencrypted, in multiple places, and failed to use readily available security measures.
32
In both cases, the FTC used the unfairness category to hold the companies accountable, not for posting a deceptive policy, but for lacking adequate security measures.
33 These cases demonstrate the broad applicability of the unfairness category of the FTC Act.
27. Id.; S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914) (concluding that a "general declaration condemning unfair practices" that would be interpreted by the commission was preferable to an "attempt to define" unfair practices); William E. Kovacic 
C. FTC Privacy Reports 2000 & 2010
The FTC launched the Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security in 1999 to investigate the security of consumers' personal information online. 34 The 2000 Privacy Report, submitted on May 15, 2000, demonstrated that online "security" is a fluid and evolving concept that must address the changing threat and particular circumstances unique to each website.
35
The 2000 Privacy Report called for an appropriateness standard which would require each website to have a security program to protect personal information to the extent that is "appropriate to the circumstances."
36 Specifically, the 2000 Privacy Report called for legislation and application of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), and asked for authority to implement the FIPPs.
37
The 2000 Privacy Report is not without its detractors. Some view it as abandoning self-regulation in favor of government regulation and argue that the legislation called for in the Report would be overly broad. 38 The detractors assert that "extensive, yet vaguely phrased, privacy requirements" constitute a "blank check" to the FTC or any (1) Notice-data collectors must disclose their information practices before collecting personal information from consumers; (2) Choice-consumers must be given options with respect to whether and how personal information collected from them may be used for purposes beyond those for which the information was provided; (3) Access-consumers should be able to view and contest the accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and (4) Security-data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure that information collected from consumers is accurate and secure from unauthorized use. The FTC examined information privacy again through a series of roundtable discussions, culminating in a proposed framework. 41 The preliminary 2010 Privacy Report states that industry efforts to address privacy through self-regulation "have been too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate and meaningful protection." 42 As the 2010 Privacy Report highlights, FIPPs, and specifically the security principle, have formed the basis of the FTC's approach to selfregulation and online privacy policies. 43 The FIPPs have long been at the core of the FTC's approach to privacy and are used as a basis for the FTC's recommended best practices.
44
The FIPPs concept of "notice-and-choice" is a common foundation for the FTC's application of its authority under section 5 of the FTC Act for deceptive or unfair practices. 45 In addition to reaffirming the FIPPs, the FTC noted the shift from the use of the deceptive category to the unfairness category through the use of the "harm-based model."
46

D. FTC Final Privacy Report 2012
In March 2012, the FTC issued a final report that incorporated public comments as well as commercial and technological advances.
47
The 2012 Privacy Report provides a guide to legislation and a set of best practices to balance the privacy interests of consumers with innovation that relies on consumer information to develop beneficial new products and services. The 2012 Privacy Report again utilizes the FIPPs for its framework of best practices for protection of consumer privacy. 49 The Report embraces the concept of privacy by design, asking companies to incorporate "substantive privacy protections into their practices, such as data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and disposal practices, and data accuracy." 50 It urges Congress to enact data security and data broker legislation, and calls on industry to hasten self-regulation processes.
51
The Report also reaffirms the FTC's decision to enforce "reasonable security for consumer data" through section 5.
52
The 2012 Privacy Report identifies five main "action items" in the realm of data security and privacy: (1) Do-Not-Track; (2) mobile security and privacy; (3) transparency in data brokerage; (4) security of "large platforms" such as ISPs, operating systems, browsers, and social media companies; and (5) further development of selfregulatory codes.
53
The 2012 Privacy Report was not approved unanimously. Commissioner Rosch dissented from its issuance on several grounds, including what he views as conflicting with the FTC's statements to Congress indicating that it would base its enforcement in deception, rather than the unfairness category under the FTC Act. 54 Commissioner Rosch argued that "'[u]nfairness' is an elastic and elusive concept," the definition of which will vary according to a party's view of privacy and information gathering in general, and therefore is an inappropriate mechanism to govern information gathering and security practices. 55 Rosch asserted that by setting a high priority on privacy, the FTC has chosen to side with consumer organizations and large enterprises and placed a burden on smaller groups. 
A. Background
After issuing a 2008 Resolution on procedures for investigating consumer privacy violations, in 2009 the FTC discovered that peer-topeer (P2P) file sharing programs were disclosing private consumer data.
60
As a result, the FTC investigated whether companies had failed to use reasonable privacy protection measures or had violated any other applicable regulations. 61 To do so, the FTC issued Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) to acquire digital copies of the private consumer information.
62
The FTC then received files containing private identifying information, such as names, dates of birth, and social security numbers of approximately 9000 LabMD customers.
63
LabMD objected to the CIDs and filed an unsuccessful petition to limit or quash the CIDs. In September 2012, the court ordered LabMD to attend a hearing and file a pleading asserting its "legal and factual support for failing to comply with the FTC's CIDs" and explain why the court should refrain from ordering compliance with the CIDs.
67
Among other questions, the court asked how the FTC met the "within the authority of the agency" standard.
68
One of the requirements for a governmental agency subpoena to be valid is a "plausible argument in support of its assertion of jurisdiction."
69 Thus, the district court has a somewhat limited role, and is constrained to analyzing the breadth of an agency's jurisdiction. 70 However, given the paucity of cases involving the FTC and consumer information security that are heard by the courts and the intense debate over the future of data security law, any judicial analysis is helpful. Thus, LabMD presented the court with an opportunity to provide some much needed judicial guidance.
B. FTC's Move Away from the Self-Regulation Model of Data Security
Until 2000, the model of FTC enforcement of consumer privacy and information security followed a standardized pattern.
71 Under the self-regulatory model, businesses could help develop standards by holding themselves to heightened duties and obligations regarding consumer information.
72 This is most evident in the FTC's use of the deceptive practices category to enforce compliance with published privacy statements; companies that made promises to consumers 65. LabMD, slip Cir. 1978 ) (stating that a "district court's role in a subpoena enforcement proceeding is strictly limited where the subpoena is attacked for lack of agency jurisdiction"); see also FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that "courts of appeals have consistently deferred to agency determinations of their own investigative authority").
71. See Scott, supra note 7, at 130 (observing that the "FTC initially sought to deal with online privacy issues by encouraging industry self-regulation").
72. Id.
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about the safety or usage of personal information were punished when they did not live up to those promises.
73
However, the FTC has become increasingly forceful in its use of section 5 to enforce information privacy and security.
74
The transition away from using the deceptive practices category to the unfair practices category occurred when the FTC filed complaints in instances where there had been no violation of stated privacy policies.
75
C. LabMD Contests the FTC's Authority
As LabMD argued and as the district court generally agreed, the FTC's power under the unfairness category is "not unlimited." The court disagreed with LabMD on its two attacks against FTC jurisdiction. It found that the 2008 Resolution "sufficiently specifies the nature, scope, and subject matter upon which subpoenas and demands for information may be made." 78 The court was much more circumspect on LabMD's second argument, finding that one could persuasively argue that section 5 does not grant the FTC authority to investigate data security breaches.
79
Conversely, to support its ruling, the court turned to prior FTC information security enforcement cases. 80 The court found that, "in light of the threat of substantial consumer harm that occurs when consumers are victims of identity theft," the FTC successfully argued that protecting the privacy of electronic consumer data falls within FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012 ) ("Although it is given broad discretion to determine what constitutes an unfair practice, the FTC's authority to investigate unfair practices using its subpoena enforcement power is not unlimited.").
77. 81 The court also relied on the weight of precedent in making its decision, stating that "federal courts have recognized the FTC's authority under Section 5 to investigate and use its authority to address unfair practices regarding related data security and consumer privacy issues." 82 However, although the cases cited by the district court represent holdings in favor of FTC jurisdiction over data security, they do not sweep as broadly as more recent FTC enforcements. 83 The cases cited by the court fall easily into section 5's prohibition of deceptive practices and involve some action taken by the defendant companies that impacted their customers' information security. 84 LabMD, however, addressed alleged omissions in a company's information security practices and procedures that allowed a third party to illegally obtain consumer information. 85 Throwing most of its argument behind the weight of history and precedent, the district court only briefly addressed the broader scope of section 5 that the FTC argued against LabMD. The court asserted:
[I]t is a plausible argument to assert that poor data security and consumer privacy practices facilitate and contribute to predictable and substantial harm to consumers in violation of Section 5 because it is disturbingly commonplace for people to wrongfully exploit poor data security and consumer privacy practices to wrongfully acquire and exploit personal consumer information. 86 Thus, the court did not fully address the FTC's enforcement of data privacy because the FTC's investigatory authority needs only a "plausible argument" for jurisdiction.
87
III. THE FUTURE OF THE FTC'S SELF-REGULATORY DATA SECURITY REGIME
In testimony before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chairman Leibowitz described "the three main principles" of the FTC's approach to information security and privacy. 88 According to Chairman Leibowitz, businesses should (1) customize and (2) simplify their electronic data privacy protections, as well as (3) provide increased transparency regarding such practices.
89
The Chairman also stated that "enforcement remains a top priority for the [FTC] "; indicating that the FTC will continue to make use of the "unfair" and "deceptive" language of the FTC Act to enforce FIPPs.
90
Section 5, however, does not expressly include information security and privacy in the FTC's jurisdiction. 91 Rather, the FTC has authority to regulate unfair practices that "cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 92 This is a necessarily fluid jurisdiction, given the constant evolution of business practices and norms. 93 Unfairness, as the courts have interpreted it, does not only rely on "the machinations of those with ill intentions;" it relies on the 87. Id. at 15 (finding that LabMD's argument against the FTC's jurisdiction "is not a sufficient reason to deny the FTC's request for enforcement").
88 233, 239-44 (1972) (reasoning that Congress refused to provide a specific definition of "unfair methods of competition" because it would be impossible to include them all); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 , 1367 -68 (11th Cir. 1988 ) (giving the FTC the authority to interpret section 5 in light of new business practices). AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:nnn foreseeable results of "ill intentioned schemes." 94 Additionally, the FTC itself has consistently been seen as having a role in interpreting section 5, 95 and has developed a history of enforcing the FTC Act in data security and privacy areas in over forty instances since 2000. 96 Precedent seems to be firmly on the side of the FTC and its role in enforcing information security and consumer privacy. 97 However, the FTC faces a different challenge to its use of the FTC Act's unfairness category in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 98 Both Wyndham and amicus parties argue that the FTC's authority to regulate unfair practices does not extend to data breaches caused by third parties. 
